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August 28, 2026·16 min read

Alphabet's 2026 annual meeting: the vote that was settled before it started

Alphabet's shareholders approved every item the Board proposed and rejected every item it opposed. Re-run the same ballot without the ten-vote Class B shares and two results reverse: a majority of unaffiliated voting power opposed the pay programme, and support for one share, one vote rises from 31% to an estimated 96%.

Alphabet held its 2026 annual meeting of shareholders on Friday 5 June, virtually, with fourteen items on the ballot and twenty-four separate line items to vote on. Holders of 12.95 billion of the 14.18 billion votes outstanding were represented, a turnout of 91.3%. Every management item carried. Every one of the ten shareholder proposals failed.

That outcome was arithmetically settled before the polls opened. Alphabet's 835.8 million Class B shares carry ten votes each, which gives insiders 58.9% of the voting power on 6.9% of the shares outstanding. Larry Page and Sergey Brin between them control 52.7%. The interesting question is therefore not whether items passed, but where the unaffiliated vote diverged from the certified result, and this year it diverged in three places: executive pay, the capital structure itself, and a shareholder-proposal agenda that has shifted from climate to artificial intelligence.

13 of 13Management items passed10 directors, 3 proposals
0 of 10Shareholder proposals passedThe Board opposed all ten
58.9%Class B share of voting poweron 6.9% of shares outstanding
80.75%Say-on-pay supportWeakest of the thirteen
31.10%Equal voting proposalStrongest of the ten
5 of 10Proposals on AI topicsWater, oversight, data usage

1. The full ballot scorecard

Support here is FOR divided by the sum of FOR, AGAINST and ABSTAIN. Broker non-votes of 580,489,723, which applied to every item except auditor ratification, are excluded from the denominator, which is how Alphabet tabulates them. Every item needed a majority of the voting power present and entitled to vote.

0%20%40%60%80%100%PROPOSAL 1: ELECTION OF DIRECTORS (10 NOMINEES, MAJORITY VOTING STANDARD)Larry Page97.85%Sergey Brin98.03%Sundar Pichai98.79%John L. Hennessy85.01%Frances H. Arnold89.94%R. Martin Chávez98.94%L. John Doerr91.80%Roger W. Ferguson Jr.98.50%K. Ram Shriram95.06%Robin L. Washington94.58%PROPOSALS 2 TO 4: MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS (BOARD RECOMMENDED FOR)2. Ratify Ernst & Young LLP as auditor (FY2026)96.15%3. Amend 2021 Stock Plan: +200,000,000 Class C shares90.31%4. Say-on-pay on NEO compensation (advisory, triennial)80.75%PROPOSALS 5 TO 14: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS (BOARD RECOMMENDED AGAINST ALL TEN)5. Enhanced disclosure on climate goals7.33%6. Report on water usage and AI development1.50%7. Equal shareholder voting (one share, one vote)31.10%8. Viewpoint diversity risk report0.16%9. Report on politicized content moderation0.21%10. Report on impact of U.S. immigration policy1.82%11. Report on data privacy governance6.01%12. AI board oversight in Audit Committee charter3.73%13. Report on AI-generated misinformation9.26%14. Report on AI data usage oversight12.21%
All twenty-four line items on the 2026 ballot, ranked within their groups. The dashed line marks the 50% approval threshold. Note the spread: management items run from 80.75% to 98.94%, while the ten shareholder proposals run from 0.16% to 31.10%.

Three numbers stand out. Say-on-pay at 80.75% was the weakest management result. John L. Hennessy at 85.01% was the weakest director. And the proposal asking Alphabet to move to one share, one vote took 31.10%, more than three times the next shareholder item and the second consecutive year above 30%.

2. Who actually decided the ballot

Alphabet runs three share classes. Class A, listed as GOOGL, carries one vote. Class B, unlisted and held almost entirely by insiders, carries ten. Class C, listed as GOOG and used for all employee equity, carries none at all.

Share classes at the record date, 6 April 2026
ClassShares outstandingVotes per share Total votes% of shares% of voting power
Class A, listed as GOOGL5,823,665,1131 5,823,665,11348.1% 41.1%
Class B, unlisted, founder held835,779,04110 8,357,790,4106.9% 58.9%
Class C, listed as GOOG5,456,336,5400 045.0%0.0%
Total12,115,780,694n/a 14,181,455,523100.0%100.0%
SHARE OF SHARES OUTSTANDING48.1%6.9%45.0%SHARE OF VOTING POWER41.1%58.9%Class A, 1 voteClass B, 10 votesClass C, no vote
Class B is 6.9% of the shares outstanding and 58.9% of the votes. Class C, 45.0% of all shares, has no vote on any item of business.

Class B converts one for one into Class A at the holder's option, but it is never sold into the market, so the wedge between capital and control is stable by construction. At the record date Page held 27.4% of the total voting power, Brin 25.3%, and all fourteen directors and executive officers together 54.3%, holding 92.2% of the Class B stock between them. BlackRock, the largest disclosed outside holder, had 2.5%.

Turnout arithmetic

Of 14,181,455,523 votes outstanding, 12,370,428,064 were cast FOR, AGAINST or ABSTAIN and 580,489,723 were broker non-votes, for 12,950,917,787 of voting power represented, or 91.32%. That leaves 1,230,537,736 votes unrepresented, all of them Class A.

3. Re-running the vote without Class B

Alphabet does not publish results by share class, so the split between insider and outside votes has to be estimated. The standard and conservative method is to assume every Class B share was voted and voted with the Board, which means FOR on management items and AGAINST on shareholder proposals. Subtract those 8,357,790,410 votes from the appropriate side and from the denominator, and what is left approximates how the unaffiliated Class A base voted.

0%25%50%75%100%Larry Page93.4%Sergey Brin93.9%Sundar Pichai96.3%John L. Hennessy53.8%Frances H. Arnold69.0%R. Martin Chávez96.7%L. John Doerr74.7%Roger W. Ferguson Jr.95.4%K. Ram Shriram84.8%Robin L. Washington83.3%2. Ratify Ernst & Young LLP as auditor89.1%3. Amend 2021 Stock Plan: +200,000,000 Class C shares70.1%4. Say-on-pay on NEO compensation40.7%OUTCOME FLIPS5. Enhanced disclosure on climate goals22.6%6. Report on water usage and AI development4.6%7. Equal shareholder voting (one share, one vote)95.9%OUTCOME FLIPS8. Viewpoint diversity risk report0.5%9. Report on politicized content moderation0.6%10. Report on impact of U.S. immigration policy5.6%11. Report on data privacy governance18.5%12. AI board oversight in Audit Committee charter11.5%13. Report on AI-generated misinformation28.6%14. Report on AI data usage oversight37.6%As voted (all classes)Excluding Class B votes (estimate)
The grey dot is the certified result, the blue dot the same ballot with Class B removed. Two items cross the 50% line, which means a one share, one vote ballot would have produced a different outcome on both.

Two outcomes invert

Say-on-pay falls from 80.75% as voted to an estimated 40.7% excluding Class B. On that basis a majority of non-insider voting power opposed the executive pay programme.

Equal shareholder voting rises from 31.10% to an estimated 95.9%. Support for retiring the dual class structure is close to unanimous among the shareholders who supply the capital.

The estimate also reframes several results that look comfortable as certified. Auditor ratification drew 3.75% against as voted but an estimated 10.9% of the non-Class B vote. The equity plan amendment drew 9.55% against as voted but an estimated 29.9%. Hennessy's re-election, 85.01% as certified, falls to an estimated 53.8%.

4. Proposal 1: the board

All ten nominees were elected, and the slate was identical to 2025. Alphabet applies a majority voting standard: a nominee failing to win a majority of the voting power present must tender a resignation for the Governance Committee to review. No nominee came close. Cumulative voting is not permitted.

Director election results, 2026 against 2025
DirectorAgeDirector sinceYears Indep.CommitteesFor (m votes)Against (m votes) Support 2026Support 2025Change (pp)Excl. Class B
Larry Page53199828NoExec (Chair)12,10525497.85%80.87%+16.9893.4%
Sergey Brin52199828NoExec12,12723298.03%97.99%+0.0493.9%
Sundar Pichai5320179NoExec12,22013898.79%98.77%+0.0296.3%
John L. Hennessy73200422YesGov (Chair)10,5161,83385.01%83.35%+1.6753.8%
Frances H. Arnold6920197YesGov11,1261,22889.94%90.04%(0.10)69.0%
R. Martin Chávez6220224YesAudit, R&C12,23911898.94%99.30%(0.36)96.7%
L. John Doerr74199927YesComp11,3561,00291.80%85.22%+6.5774.7%
Roger W. Ferguson Jr.74201610YesAudit (Chair), R&C (Chair)12,18517298.50%99.03%(0.52)95.4%
K. Ram Shriram69199828YesComp11,76059695.06%88.79%+6.2784.8%
Robin L. Washington6320197YesComp (Chair), Audit, R&C11,70065894.58%88.59%+5.9983.3%
0%5%10%15%20%Larry Page2.119.1Sergey Brin1.92.0Sundar Pichai1.11.2John L. Hennessy14.816.5Frances H. Arnold9.99.8R. Martin Chávez1.00.7L. John Doerr8.114.7Roger W. Ferguson Jr.1.40.9K. Ram Shriram4.811.1Robin L. Washington5.311.42025 against %2026 against %
Against votes as a share of votes cast. Opposition rose for only three nominees, Ferguson by 0.52pp, Chávez by 0.36pp and Arnold by 0.10pp, all from very low bases.

Dissent tracks tenure rather than independence. The four longest-serving directors, Page, Brin and Shriram since 1998 and Doerr since 1999, sit alongside Hennessy, who joined in 2004, at the bottom of the table. The two most recently appointed independents, R. Martin Chávez and Roger W. Ferguson Jr., both cleared 98.5%.

The board runs five standing committees. Audit is the working committee, with thirteen meetings and eight written consents in 2025. The Risk and Compliance Committee was created in October 2025 and met once. The Leadership Development, Inclusion and Compensation Committee met five times and acted by written consent eighteen times, a ratio that sits awkwardly beside the say-on-pay result. The Executive Committee, made up of Page, Brin and Pichai, did not meet at all.

5. Proposals 2 to 4: auditor, equity plan and pay

Management proposals
#Management proposalFor (m) Against (m)Abstain (m)Broker non-votes (m)Support Excl. Class B
2Ratify Ernst & Young LLP as auditor (FY2026)12,45248613none96.15%89.1%
3Amend 2021 Stock Plan: +200,000,000 Class C shares11,1721,1811758090.31%70.1%
4Say-on-pay on NEO compensation (advisory, triennial)9,9892,3344858080.75%40.7%

Executive pay

Alphabet holds its say-on-pay vote every three years and its say-when-on-pay vote every six, so the next advisory vote on compensation does not fall until 2029. That infrequency is part of why the vote matters: shareholders get one opportunity in three years to register a view, and 18.86% of the votes cast used it to object.

Named executive officer compensation, FY2025, in dollars
OfficerSalaryStock awardsAll other Total 2025Total 2024Change
Sundar PichaiCEO, Alphabet & Google2,007,69208,898,38710,906,07910,800,694+1%
Anat AshkenaziSVP, Chief Financial Officer1,003,84630,171,07084,11531,259,03149,978,135(37%)
Ruth M. PoratPresident & Chief Investment Officer1,003,84628,123,53211,75029,139,12830,166,427(3%)
Philipp SchindlerSVP, Chief Business Officer, Google1,003,84640,577,554620,15142,201,55147,024,009(10%)
Kent WalkerPresident Global Affairs; Chief Legal Officer1,003,84628,123,53211,75029,139,12830,162,760(3%)
Sundar Pichai$10.9MAnat Ashkenazi$31.3MRuth M. Porat$29.1MPhilipp Schindler$42.2MKent Walker$29.1MSalaryStock awardsAll other comp.
Stock awards at grant date fair value under ASC 718. The CEO took no new equity award in 2025 because his 2022 grant vests through 2026.

Four officers sit in the $29m to $42m range on largely time-vesting stock units. The SVP cash bonus was discontinued in February 2025 and its $2.0m target rolled into performance units, with transitional grants of $2.67m to $3.67m each to hold target pay flat; 2026 is the final year of that transition. Sundar Pichai's headline $10.9m is salary plus $8.90m of other compensation, overwhelmingly personal security and aircraft use, and understates realised pay because it excludes equity granted in earlier cycles. The CEO pay ratio is 35 to 1, low for a US mega cap, but only because Alphabet's median employee earned $310,826 in 2025.

The equity plan

Proposal 3 added 200 million Class C shares to the 2021 Stock Plan, which shareholders have now amended at the 2022, 2023 and 2026 meetings.

Dilution after the 2026 amendment
Amended 2021 Stock Plan, Class CShares % of shares outstanding
Outstanding GSU and PSU awards at 31 Dec 2025 281,490,6042.32%
Available for future issuance534,281,345 4.41%
Newly authorised at the 2026 meeting200,000,000 1.65%
Total overhang after approval 1,015,771,9498.38%

The denominator is 12,115,780,694 shares across all three classes at the record date. FY2025 stock-based compensation expense was $24.95bn, and buybacks of $45.71bn more than offset issuance. Because only Class C shares are issued under the plan, equity pay dilutes economic ownership every year without moving control by a single vote.

The auditor

Ernst & Young fees, in thousands of dollars
Fee category20242025% of 2025 total Change
Audit fees31,13037,90055.2%+21.7%
Audit-related fees11,7679,50613.8%(19.2%)
Tax fees1,3861,8942.8%+36.7%
All other fees21,22919,40028.2%(8.6%)
Total fees65,51268,700100.0%+4.9%
2024 total $65.5M31.111.821.22025 total $68.7M37.99.519.4Audit feesAudit-related feesTax feesAll other fees
Composition of total fees paid to Ernst & Young, 2024 against 2025.

Non-audit fees, meaning audit related, tax and other, were $30.8m of $68.7m, or 44.8% of the 2025 total. That is down from 52.5% in 2024 but still high against the 20% to 30% typical of large cap US issuers. The direction of travel is favourable, with audit fees up 21.7% to $37.9m while all other fees fell 8.6%. Ratification is the only routine item on the ballot, so brokers may vote uninstructed shares, which is why Proposal 2 carries no broker non-votes and a larger denominator than everything else.

6. Proposals 5 to 14: ten shareholder proposals

Shareholder proposals, all opposed by the Board and all defeated
#ProposalLead proponent ThemeFor (m)Against (m)Support 2026 Support 2025Excl. Class B
5Enhanced disclosure on climate goalsTrillium ESG Global Equity Fund (lead)Climate90711,4277.33%8.19%22.6%
6Report on water usage and AI developmentInspire Investing, LLCAI / Env18512,1311.50%n/a4.6%
7Equal shareholder voting (one share, one vote)NorthStar Asset Mgmt Pension Plan; Mercy InvestmentStructure3,8478,50331.10%30.63%95.9%
8Viewpoint diversity risk reportNational Center for Public Policy ResearchAnti-ESG1912,3250.16%n/a0.5%
9Report on politicized content moderationBowyer Research for The Heritage FoundationAnti-ESG2612,2990.21%n/a0.6%
10Report on impact of U.S. immigration policySOC Investment GroupWorkforce22512,0981.82%n/a5.6%
11Report on data privacy governanceZevin Asset Mgmt for D. & G. BergmanPrivacy74411,5886.01%n/a18.5%
12AI board oversight in Audit Committee charterSHARE for Pension Plan of United Church of CanadaAI46111,8633.73%n/a11.5%
13Report on AI-generated misinformationVancity Investment ManagementAI1,14611,1809.26%n/a28.6%
14Report on AI data usage oversightNational Legal and Policy CenterAI1,51110,80712.21%12.31%37.6%
0%25%50%75%100%7. Equal shareholder voting (one share, one vote)31.10%96%14. Report on AI data usage oversight12.21%38%13. Report on AI-generated misinformation9.26%29%5. Enhanced disclosure on climate goals7.33%23%11. Report on data privacy governance6.01%19%12. AI board oversight in Audit Committee charter3.73%12%10. Report on impact of U.S. immigration policy1.82%6%6. Report on water usage and AI development1.50%5%9. Report on politicized content moderation0.21%1%8. Viewpoint diversity risk report0.16%0%As votedExcluding Class B (estimate)
Support ranked, as voted and with Class B votes removed. Equal shareholder voting is the only proposal that clears a majority on either basis.

Alphabet faced twelve shareholder proposals in 2025 plus one presented from the floor, so the count fell from thirteen to ten. The subject matter, however, turned over almost completely, and five patterns are worth drawing out.

  • One structural proposal dominates. Equal voting took 31.10%, more than three times the next item, after 30.63% in 2025. Stripped of Class B it is an estimated 95.9%.
  • AI is the new centre of gravity. Four proposals were explicitly about AI, numbers 6, 12, 13 and 14, and a fifth on data privacy is AI adjacent. AI data usage oversight took 12.21% and AI misinformation 9.26%, both above the climate proposal. Together the four AI proposals drew 3.30bn votes in favour, more than any theme on the ballot except the capital structure.
  • Climate support is eroding. The climate disclosure proposal fell from 8.19% to 7.33% even though the proponent tied it directly to data centre electricity demand rather than to abstract targets.
  • Anti-ESG proposals are rejected outright. Viewpoint diversity at 0.16% and politicized content moderation at 0.21% were the two weakest results on the ballot, below 0.7% even excluding Class B, so the large index managers voted them down as decisively as insiders did.
  • Repeat institutional filers dominate. Faith based, labour linked and values based funds, namely Trillium, Mercy, NorthStar, SHARE for the United Church of Canada, SOC, Vancity and Zevin, filed six of the ten. The remaining four came from conservative advocacy groups.
Repeat proposals, year on year
Proposal20252026Change (pp) 2026 excl. Class B
Equal shareholder voting30.63% 31.10%+0.4795.9%
AI data usage oversight12.31% 12.21%(0.10)37.6%
Enhanced climate goal disclosure8.19% 7.33%(0.86)22.6%

Under the SEC Rule 14a-8 resubmission thresholds, 5% after one year and 15% after three, all three clear the bar to return in 2027.

What each proposal asked, and the Board's stated answer

#The ask Board's stated ground for opposing
5Enhanced climate goal disclosure tied to data centre power demandExisting environmental reporting already covers climate plans, progress and practices
6Report on water use in AI developmentWater strategy is already set out in sustainability reporting
7Recapitalise to one share, one vote within seven yearsThe capital structure enables strategic flexibility and other safeguards apply
8Independent committee to report on viewpoint diversity riskA report on political or ideological metrics would misalign with business led leadership
9Report on risks of politicized content moderation metricsModeration follows published policies with independent transparency reporting
10Report on how US immigration policy and H-1B fees affect operationsWould constrain workforce management and expose sensitive strategic data
11Report on governance gaps in user and cloud customer data handlingA multi layered privacy framework and extensive disclosure already exist
12Write AI oversight into the Audit Committee charterThe Board already has technical depth and a Risk and Compliance Committee was created in October 2025
13Report on material risks from AI generated misinformationGovernance grounded in the AI Principles already mitigates the risk
14Report on oversight of data used to train AIAI and data governance frameworks provide comprehensive oversight

Only one proposal can be said to have moved the company, and it moved before the vote rather than because of it. Proposal 12 asked for AI oversight to be written into the Audit Committee charter; Alphabet created a Risk and Compliance Committee in October 2025 and cited it in opposing the proposal. The proposal still drew 3.73% as voted, an estimated 11.5% of the non-Class B vote.

7. The FY2025 backdrop

REVENUE307.42023350.02024402.82025+15% YoYOPERATING INCOME84.32023112.42024129.02025+15% YoYNET INCOME73.82023100.12024132.22025+32% YoYOP. CASH FLOW101.72023125.32024164.72025+31% YoYCAPEX32.3202352.5202491.42025+74% YoYR&D45.4202349.3202461.12025+24% YoYBUYBACKS61.5202362.2202445.72025(27%) YoYDIVIDENDSn/a20237.4202410.02025+36% YoY$ in billions
Alphabet's headline financials for 2023 to 2025, in billions of dollars, with the change from 2024 to 2025 beneath each panel.

Capital expenditure of $91.4bn, up 74% in one year and 184% in two, sits underneath almost every shareholder proposal on this ballot. The water proposal, the climate proposal, the AI oversight proposal and the immigration proposal all argue from data centre build out. Against that, net income of $132.2bn and a 32.0% operating margin gave management the strongest possible position from which to reject all ten. Buybacks fell 27% to $45.7bn as capital expenditure absorbed cash, while the dividend introduced in 2024 grew 36% to $10.0bn.

Segment results, in millions of dollars
SegmentRevenue 2024Revenue 2025Growth Op. income 2024Op. income 20252025 op. margin
Google Services304,930342,721+12.4%121,263139,40440.7%
Google Cloud43,22958,705+35.8%6,11213,91023.7%
Other Bets1,6481,537(6.7%)-4,444-7,515n/m
Alphabet total350,018 402,836+15.1%112,390 129,03932.0%
Revenue by line, in millions of dollars
Revenue line20242025Growth % of 2025 revenue
Google Search and other198,084224,532+13.4%55.7%
YouTube ads36,14740,367+11.7%10.0%
Google Network30,35929,792(1.9%)7.4%
Subscriptions, platforms and devices40,34048,030+19.1%11.9%
Google Cloud43,22958,705+35.8%14.6%
Other Bets and hedging1,8591,410(24.2%)0.4%
Total revenues350,018402,836+15.1%100.0%

Alphabet level activities, a loss of $16.76bn in 2025, are not allocated to segments, so segment operating income exceeds the consolidated total. Diluted earnings per share rose from $8.04 to $10.81, and Google Cloud reached a 23.7% operating margin against 14.1% in 2024. Geographically, US revenue of $194.2bn was 48.2% of the total and EMEA $117.2bn was 29.1%, so roughly half of Alphabet's revenue sits outside the jurisdiction whose immigration and AI rules two of this year's proposals addressed.

8. What the meeting showed

A meeting with no contested outcome still produced three durable signals.

First, a majority of unaffiliated voting power opposes the executive pay programme, and cannot say so again until 2029. The triennial cadence means the objection registered in June 2026 has no further outlet for four years, while the transition of the SVP bonus into performance units runs through 2026 and total packages stay in the $29m to $42m range.

Second, that same base wants the dual class structure retired, by a margin that is near unanimous once founder votes are excluded. The proposal has cleared 30% as voted in two consecutive years, and its resubmission is effectively guaranteed.

Third, the shareholder-proposal agenda has completed its shift from climate to AI governance. Water use, board oversight, misinformation and data usage all outpolled the climate resolution, and the climate resolution itself declined. This is the first Alphabet ballot on which AI, rather than emissions or content policy, was the dominant theme.

None of this changes an Alphabet vote while Class B exists. But all three signals are now in the public record, two of the three are rising rather than fading, and they arrive alongside a capital expenditure programme that has nearly tripled in two years.

9. Method and sources

Vote totals are taken from Item 5.07 of the Form 8-K filed 11 June 2026. Proposal text, proponents, board recommendations, share counts at the record date, beneficial ownership, committee membership, compensation tables and audit fees come from the definitive proxy statement filed 24 April 2026. Financial figures come from the Form 10-K for FY2025 filed 4 February 2026, and 2025 comparatives from the Form 8-K filed 12 June 2025.

The excluding Class B figures throughout are an estimate, not a disclosure. Alphabet does not publish results by share class. For management items, FOR votes are reduced by the full 8,357,790,410 Class B votes; for shareholder proposals, AGAINST votes are reduced by the same amount; the denominator in both cases is votes cast less Class B votes. The estimate assumes every Class B share was voted and voted with the Board, which is conservative in the sense that any Class B vote against management would push the adjusted figures further in the direction described.

Sources: Alphabet Inc. Form 8-K filed 11 June 2026 (Items 5.02 and 5.07); DEF 14A filed 24 April 2026; Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025, filed 4 February 2026; Form 8-K filed 12 June 2025. Filing data retrieved through sec-api.io.